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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 19/07/2011

Accident number: 785

Accident time: 11:05

Accident Date: 10/12/2007

Where it occurred: AF/0105/01632,
MF018, Barikab
Village, Qarabagh
District, Kabul
Province

Country: Afghanistan

Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)

Class: Excavation accident

Date of main report: None

ID original source: (40)

Name of source: UNMACCA

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: YM-1 AP blast

Ground condition: not recorded
Date last modified: 19/07/2011

Date record created:
No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: Not recorded

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate investigation (?)
use of pick (?)
Inadequate detector pinpointing
handtool may have increased injury (?)
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?)
visor not worn or worn raised (?)

Accident report
The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is a UNMACCA Lessons
Learned document. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting
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being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised if more
information becomes available.
The document is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.

LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF DEMINING ACCIDENT involving [Demining group]
DT# 12 ON 10 DECEMBER 2007
INTRODUCTION:
An investigation team was convened by Area Manager of AMAC Centre (Kabul) to investigate
the demining accident involving [the Victim] a deminer from [Demining group] DT # 12. The
accident occurred at 11:05 hours on 13 [sic] December 2007 at task # AF/0105/01632/MF018
located in Barikab Village, Qarabagh District of Kabul Province.
SUMMARY:
Task # AF/0105/01632/MF018 is located at the east side of Bagram new road which have
been recorded by LIAT as SHA#1 of newly identified IS# CA 15. During the year 1998 to 2001
the area was a front line between northern alliance and the Taliban, and mines have been
planted by both parties. The area is a high priority task because a new township will be
constructed in the area for the returnees. [Demining group] DT#12 was tasked to conduct
mine clearance operation of the mentioned area.
On 13/12/2007 at 11:05hrs a demining accident happened on a deminer named [the Victim]
as he was working on a detected signal using a pick; suddenly his pick hit top of an YM1
Iranian AP mine and caused it to explode. As a result of the explosion the victim deminer got
injuries to his face, eyes and fingers of his right hand.
During the accident the deminer had his apron on, but the visor of his helmet was up or may
did not wear the helmet at all, and that is why he got injuries to his face and eyes.
Medical first aid was applied to the deminer by team medic at the site and then the casualty
was evacuated to Charikar hospital for treatments.
CONCLUSIONS:
The investigation team found the followings:
•

The deminer failed to identify the centre of the single while detecting the ground using
mine detector.

•

The deminer was working carelessly as he was working with the pick and stroke top
of the mine which is an inappropriate practice.

•

Working of deminer with his visor up or not wearing the helmet reveals poor
command and control of relevant section leader as he failed to prevent the deminer of
doing such safety breach, as the investigation team did not find any sign of explosion
effect on the helmet of the deminer, so there is much possibility that the deminer did
not had the helmet on his head.

RECOMMENDATIONS:
The following points are to be considered:
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•

Refresher training with much focus on detecting of the signal and excavation drill for
the team and special training for command group focusing on better controlling of
team activities and quality check of deminer out put is recommended.

•

The internal quality control is to be reinforced by relevant organization to make sure
the teams are working according to approved procedure.

•

All team command groups are to strictly control the team operation and make sure
the deminers are well dressed with PPE.

Victim Report
Victim number: 971

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: Not made available

Protection issued: Frontal apron

Protection used: Frontal apron

Long visor

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES: severe Eyes; severe Face; severe Hand
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. ". . . got injuries to his face, eyes and
fingers of his right hand".

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Field Control Inadequacy because the victim
was working with his visor raised (or removed) and with an inappropriate tool and his errors
were not corrected. The secondary cause is listed as Inadequate training because the
investigators found that training in metal-detector pinpointing and safe excavation was
required.
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident
report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years,
so ignoring the requirements of the IMAS. It is noteworthy that the Afghan national staff have
been more responsible over sharing data than those internationals who presume greater
responsibility.
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